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INTRODUCTION: FORENSIC SCIENCE AND THE NATIONAL RESEARCH 
COUNCIL REPORT 
For at least three decades we have witnessed an academic critique of the 
quality of forensics evidence as it is employed in criminal prosecutions.1  
Although the critique has proceeded at many levels, at its core is the fact 
that many forensic science fields have failed to conduct the research neces-
sary to test the reliability and validity of the methods and techniques foren-
sic witnesses employ to support their courtroom testimony in criminal cas-
es.  The critique became more vocal and more persistent with the United 
States Supreme Court admissibility decisions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,2 General Electric v. Joiner,3 and Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael.4 
 
∗ A.A. White Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. 
 1. The argument is as least as old as Professor Giannelli’s insightful critique of the 
Frye rule in 1980. Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States, A Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197 (1980). 
 2. 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993). 
 3. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 4. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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In the early years following Daubert, it sometimes seemed that the fo-
rensic expert community simply didn’t understand the academic critique.5  
For example, D. Michael Risinger reports that during a 1996 discussion, 
document examiners made the following comments: “Only we who do it 
can know that what we say about it is true,” and “[they] went after our 
weak point: no data.”6  Later, the expert community developed more elabo-
rate justifications for its practices and its lack of interest in conducting re-
search designed to test the validity and reliability of its conclusions.  Mi-
chael J. Saks and Jonathan J. Koehler have persuasively argued that at the 
heart of this set of justifications are the concepts of individualization and 
uniqueness.7  As Simon Cole notes, individualization is understood to mean 
that it is possible to narrow the potential sources of a forensic trace “to a 
single object in the universe,” and this sort of individualization is itself 
supported by the assumption that each forensic object (a fingerprint, a spent 
bullet, a bite-mark, a signature) is unique.8  Combined, these assumptions 
lead to assertions such as the following: “And we profess as fingerprint ex-
aminers that the rate of error is zero.  And the reason we make that bold 
statement is because we know based on 100 years of research that every-
body’s fingerprints are unique, and in nature it [sic] is never going to repeat 
itself again.”9  Empirical investigations by outside experts on the ability of 
forensic experts to make such assertions are claimed to be unnecessary.10 
It is against this backdrop that the National Research Council (NRC) 
published its Report, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: 
A Path Forward.  The Report clearly sides with the critics.  The Report’s 
summary makes the following observation: “With the exception of nuclear 
DNA analysis . . . no forensic method has been rigorously shown to have 
 
 5. See Andre A. Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence in the Post-Daubert 
World, 66 UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997). 
 6. D. Michael Risinger, Mark P. Denbeaux & Michael J. Saks, Brave New “Post-
Daubert World”—A Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405, 441 n.108 
(1998). 
 7. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Foren-
sic Science Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008). 
 8. See Simon Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness, Conclusions Without Individualiza-
tion: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 233, 
235 (2009); D. Michael Risinger & Mark P. Denbeaux, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: 
How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15 (2003). 
 9. Cole, supra note 8, at 237 (quoting Transcript of Trial, People v. Gomez, No. 
99CF0391 (Cal. Super. Ct. Orange Cty. 2002)). 
 10. See Moenssens, supra note 5, at 303-04. 
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the capacity to consistently, and with a high degree of certainty, demon-
strate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or source.”11 
The Report offers a series of recommendations designed to change this 
state of affairs.  Its first recommendation is the establishment of a National 
Institute of Forensic Science that would be independent from the existing 
forensics community and would have an advisory board with expertise in 
multiple disciplines.  Its third recommendation is a call for research to as-
sess accuracy, reliability, and validity in the forensic science disciplines.12 
What is interesting is that the recommendations are neither directed at 
the courts, nor do they call on the courts to use the admissibility standards 
developed in Daubert and state court analogs to tighten admissibility stan-
dards.  Certainly, this is not because the courts are already doing a good job 
in this regard.  The Report agrees with many commentators that the courts 
have not adequately policed forensic experts.13  In a rather blunt passage, 
the Report adopts Peter Neufeld’s assessment that “the courts have been 
‘utterly ineffective’ in addressing the problem” of unreliable testimony.14 
In Part I, I review the NRC’s stated reasons for giving the courts little or 
no role in improving forensic evidence and argue that these reasons cannot 
explain the fact that the same courts have played a significant role in polic-
ing expertise in civil cases.  Why then have courts been so reluctant to ex-
clude forensic expert evidence?  I explore this question in Part II.  I argue 
that two deep seated factors: (1) the courts’ contextual approach to know-
ledge, and (2) the limited ability of science to provide causal answers about 
the particular case, limit the courts’ willingness to raise admissibility stan-
dards in forensic cases.  In Part III, I argue that courts can play a limited 
role in improving expert forensic evidence by excluding the worst evidence 
in each area.  I believe that to date they have not done so consistently in 
 
 11. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCI., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE 
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009) [hereinafter STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCE]. 
 12. Id. at 22. 
 13. See Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert 
Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 364 
(2002) (“[T]he Daubert decision did not impact on the admission rates of expert testimony 
at either the trial or appellate court levels.”); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Relia-
bility: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 
103-12 (2000) (providing empirical evidence that judges are more likely to admit prosecu-
tion expert testimony than other types of expert testimony).  For a review of the empirical 
findings, see David L. Faigman, Admissibility Regimes: The “Opinion Rule” and Other 
Oddities and Exceptions to Scientific Evidence, The Scientific Revolution and Common 
Sense, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 699, 717-18 (2008). 
 14. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 109 (quoting Peter J. Neufeld, 
The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice and Some Suggestions for Reform, 95 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 107, 108 (2005)). 
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part because the forensic community has made it difficult to easily distin-
guish between better and worse testimony.  I propose some steps that could 
be taken to make such distinctions more transparent.  I briefly review ad-
missibility decisions in drunk driving cases to indicate how greater transpa-
rency in that area has led to more frequent exclusion of less well-supported 
conclusions.  I end with a brief conclusion. 
I.  THE NRC’S REASONS FOR GIVING THE COURTS ALMOST NO ROLE 
IN IMPROVING FORENSIC EXPERTISE 
Prior to the Daubert trilogy of cases, one might have argued that the 
courts could play no role in improving expert testimony because they do 
not have the conceptual tools to do so.  This is no longer the case.  Unlike 
the Frye test that asked judges when making admissibility determinations 
to defer to the judgment of the relevant expert community—too often inter-
preted as the community of individuals offering their testimony in court—
the Daubert opinion invited judges to assess the evidence themselves, un-
dermining the self-validating tendency of the Frye test.15  Moreover, the 
Daubert Court equated evidentiary reliability with scientific validity16 and 
declared that two important admissibility factors were whether theory or 
technique could be, and has been, tested,17 and the error rate associated 
with a procedure.18  Many forensic areas score poorly on these factors.19 
Why, then, does the Report fail to call upon the courts to change their 
liberal admissibility policy?  The answer, apparently, is that the Report has 
no faith in the ability of the courts to use these tools, or at least no faith in 
their ability to use them effectively.  Here is one key passage explaining 
why the Report gives the courts a pass: 
The judicial system is encumbered by, among other things, judges and 
lawyers who generally lack the scientific expertise necessary to compre-
hend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed manner, trial judges 
(sitting alone) who must decide evidentiary issues without the benefit of 
judicial colleagues and often with little time for extensive research and 
reflection, and the highly deferential nature of the appellate review af-
 
 15. Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons From the Law’s Formative Encoun-
ters With Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1139 (1998) (“But per-
haps the purpose of the rules is simply to hold up a target to the courts; call one the Frye tar-
get and the other the Daubert target.  The Frye ideal says: do whatever the experts tell you to 
do.  The Daubert ideal says: figure out the science yourself.”). 
 16. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993). 
 17. Id. at 593. 
 18. Id. at 594. 
 19. See, e.g., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 142-44 (discussing 
fingerprint friction analysis). 
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forded trial courts’ Daubert rulings.  Furthermore, the judicial system 
embodies a case-by-case adjudicatory approach that is not well suited to 
address the systematic problems in many of the various forensic science 
disciplines.20 
The implication is that judges are simply not up to the challenge.  A com-
bination of lack of time, lack of general focus, and lack of expertise, places 
this task beyond the ability of the judiciary. 
Undoubtedly, a great many opinions admitting forensic evidence leave 
much to be desired.  The inanities sometimes advanced to admit forensic 
testimony are well documented.  Consider the following examples. 
In a microscopic hair comparison case, the Kentucky Supreme Court, 
purportedly applying the state’s Daubert test, was presented with no empir-
ical support for the reliability of the test and ultimately fell back on general 
acceptance.21  But it did so in a very backhanded way.  There were no Ken-
tucky cases reviewing such evidence under Frye.  The court took this ab-
sence of any prior assessment of the admissibility of microscopic hair anal-
ysis as evidence for its admissibility. 
Although we have never specifically addressed the scientific reliability of 
this method of hair analysis, we must assume that it at least satisfied the 
Frye test of general acceptance; for otherwise, the evidence would never 
have been admitted in the first place.  The absence in our previous opi-
nions of any in-depth analysis under the “general acceptance” test was 
probably due to the overwhelming acceptance of this procedure as a relia-
ble scientific method for the past fifty years.22 
Additionally, the United States District Court of the Southern District of 
Indiana in United States v. Havvard,23 ruled on the issue of whether finger-
print analyses had been tested per Daubert’s falsification criterion. 
They have been tested for roughly 100 years.  They have been tested in 
adversarial proceedings with the highest possible stakes—liberty and 
sometimes life.  The defense has offered no evidence in this case under-
mining the reliability of the methods in general.  The government points 
 
 20. Id. at 110. 
 21. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258 (1999). 
 22. Id. at 262.  In lieu of any Kentucky cases on point, the court points to opinions in a 
number of other states declaring such testimony to be admissible.  Never mind that in none 
of those cases did the court perform even a perfunctory analysis of the reliability of this evi-
dence.  In most of these cases either there was no mention of the Frye test, or the evidence 
that the testimony was generally accepted came from the witness himself. See, e.g., McGrew 
v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289, 1291 (1997); see also Michael J. Saks, Explaining the Tension 
Between the Supreme Court’s Embrace of Validity as the Touchstone of Admissibility of Ex-
pert Testimony and Lower Courts’ (Seeming) Rejection of Same, 5 EPISTEME 329, 339 
(2008) (discussing Johnson, 12 S.W.3d 258). 
 23. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
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out correctly that if anyone were to come across a case in which two dif-
ferent fingers had identical fingerprints, that news would flash around the 
legal world at the speed of light.  It has not happened in 100 years.24 
In the fingerprint arena, Havvard hardly stands alone.  With very few 
exceptions, courts have refused to conduct Daubert hearings,25 have impli-
citly reversed the burden of persuasion to require the defendant to demon-
strate that a fingerprint identification is not reliable,26 have admitted expert 
testimony by relying on the fact that other courts have admitted the testi-
mony,27 have relegated any concerns about validity to weight, not admissi-
bility,28 and in general have lowered the bar to the level necessary to admit 
fingerprint identification.29  Perhaps most importantly, most courts have 
not been sensitive to the importance of distinguishing among different 
identification situations and, therefore, have failed to follow Kumho Tire’s 
admonition to focus on the task at hand.30 
These examples to the contrary notwithstanding, the reasons the Report 
gives as to why the judiciary has not done a better job policing the quality 
 
 24. Id. at 854.  The most obvious problem with this passage is that the court substitutes 
the adversarial process for scientific investigation, a move all too often seen in forensic ad-
missibility opinions.  Moreover, the court simply confuses the relevant issue.  The last sen-
tence focuses on the issue of whether any two different fingerprints are identical.  Even if 
we agree that they are not, this does not mean that there is good empirical research on the 
ability of an examiner to state with certainty that a blurred partial print could come from one 
and only one source. 
  Out of abundant caution, I want to be clear that no one thinks fingerprint identifica-
tion and microscopic hair analysis are equally likely to produce errors.  Clearly, there are 
better (fingerprints) and less reliable (voiceprint) methods available to forensic scientists.  
See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of a 
Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 134 (2008).  However, in all of 
these areas there are numerous opinions that simply do not address the quality of the evi-
dence supporting expert testimony. 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Ambriz-Vasquez, 34 F. App’x 356, 359 (9th Cir. 2002); 
United States v. Joseph, No. CR.A.99-238, 2001 WL 515213 (E.D. La. May 14, 2001). 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 26 F. App’x 171, 173 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 27. See, e.g., Havvard, 260 F.3d at 601; United States v. Frias, No. S3 01 Crim. 307 
(AGS), 2003 WL 352502 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2003). 
 28. See, e.g., United States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1294 (D. Kan. 2002), aff’d, 
349 F.3d. 1276 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 29. See id.  A rare exception to this landslide of opinions admitting fingerprint evidence 
was United States v. Llera-Plaza, 57 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 983 (E.D. Pa. 2002) but Judge Pol-
lak withdrew his initial opinion excluding fingerprint evidence and admitted the evidence.  
United States v. Llera-Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002); see also United States v. 
Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 278 (4th Cir. 2003) (Michael, J. dissenting) (suggesting that fingerprint 
evidence should have been excluded). 
 30. For a discussion of the post-Daubert case law on the admissibility of fingerprint 
evidence see 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 33:3-33:19 
(2008-2009).  Although I have focused on federal court opinions, the states generally repli-
cate this pattern.  See id. 
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of expert testimony seems to me to miss the mark.  Throughout the Dau-
bert era, I have played the role of an interested observer of the forensics 
wars.  My own focus has largely been on experts in civil cases, most spe-
cifically in toxic tort litigation.  In those cases, the judiciary has played an 
active role in policing the quality of expert testimony.  Critics usually com-
plain that, if anything, the courts have been too restrictive.31 
In my opinion, on balance, the courts have performed their gate-keeping 
role with a reasonable degree of competence.  Moreover, in the years since 
Daubert, they have become more sophisticated in their assessment of ex-
pert testimony, primarily because they have moved away from using the 
four Daubert factors to make global statements concerning the reliability of 
an area of knowledge and instead focused on the fit between the available 
scientific evidence and the testimony of the witness.32 
The fact that courts do police the reliability of expert testimony in toxic 
cases raises the question of why they cannot play a significant role in the 
forensic arena.  Civil law jurisprudence suggests that the reason cannot be, 
as the Report suggests, that judges lack the scientific expertise necessary to 
comprehend and evaluate this evidence.  There are many civil law cases in 
the toxic tort arena where the scientific issues are at least as complex as 
 
 31. Among the critical articles are: Michael F. Baumeister & Dorothea M. Capone, Ad-
missibility Standards as Politics—The Imperial Gate Closers Arrive!!!, 33 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1025 (2003); Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed 
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257 (2005); Margaret A. Berger, Upsetting 
the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Ex-
pert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 324 (2001); Carl 
F. Cranor & David A. Eastmond, Scientific Ignorance and Reliable Patterns of Evidence in 
Toxic Tort Causation: Is There a Need for Liability Reform?, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
5, 15 (2001); Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges 
are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 335, 337 (1999); Allan Kanner & M. Ryan Casey, Daubert and the Disappearing Jury 
Trial, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 281 (2007); Bobak Razavi, Admissible Expert Testimony and 
Summary Judgment, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 307 (2008). 
 32. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, A ‘Daubert’ Checklist, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 12, 2005, at 
12.  “Consequently, today many judges have moved beyond a mechanistic checklist ap-
proach.  Rather, they address the broader, bottomline question of the reliability of the evi-
dence . . . .  They sift through the foundational testimony to determine whether there is an 
‘empirically supported rational explanation’ for the expert’s opinion.” Bert Black, Learn the 
Science in Your Cases, 39 TRIAL 18, 19-20, 25 (2003). 
  Increasingly, judges feel comfortable addressing such considerations as the size of 
the researchers’ database, its composition, the test conditions, and the rates for false posi-
tives and negatives.  These judges no longer mechanistically tally up the number of Daubert 
factors favoring or opposing admission.  Instead, they quite correctly address the bottom 
line: Does the proponent’s empirical data establish that this expert can accurately draw the 
inference that he or she is prepared to testify to? 
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those in the forensic area.33  It is true that trial courts, especially state trial 
courts, have limited time and resources to devote to admissibility issues, 
but federal district courts confront the same time and resource pressures in 
civil and criminal cases and still do a more thorough job on the civil side. 
Another argument advanced by the Report as to why the judiciary has no 
substantial role to play in improving forensic science is that “the case-by-
case adjudicatory approach [is] not well suited to address the systematic 
problems in many of the various forensic science disciplines.”34  Once 
again it is important to note that the same constraint confronts admissibility 
decisions in civil cases and yet, over time, courts are able to sort out the 
merits of expert testimony with respect to different alleged injuries.35  In-
deed, the underlying issue in Daubert is a case in point.  Over time, the 
courts concluded that human and animal studies on the relationship be-
tween the morning sickness drug Bendectin and birth defects in the child-
ren of mothers who ingested the drug was insufficient to support expert tes-
timony alleging such a relationship.36 
Perhaps an even better example is the silicone breast implant litigation.  
In the earliest years of the litigation, before much scientific evidence had 
been accumulated, courts generally admitted plaintiffs’ expert testimony.37  
By the late 1990s, there was more epidemiological data indicating no caus-
al relationship between implants and traditional autoimmune disease.  
Court decisions were more mixed on the admissibility of plaintiff experts.38  
In 1998, a Federal Rule of Evidence 706 expert panel appointed by the sili-
cone breast implant multi-district litigation judge issued its report.39  This 
was followed in 2000 by a report from the National Academy of Science 
(NAS).40  Both concluded that there was no relationship between implants 
and autoimmune or connective tissue diseases.41 
 
 33. See 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 22:23 (2008-
2009) for insightful analyses of difficult toxicology and epidemiology questions. 
 34. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 110. 
 35. See FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 33, at §§ 22:23-22:42. 
 36. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF 
MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996); JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A 
STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION (1998). 
 37. Hopkins v.  Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 38. Compare Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998), and 
Jennings v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 14 P.3d 596 (Or. 2000) (experts admitted), with In re 
Breast Implant Litig., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1217 (D. Colo. 1998) (expert excluded). 
 39. In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 40. INST. OF MED., SAFETY OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 10-11 (Stuart Bondurant et 
al., eds., 2000). 
 41. The Multidistrict Panel findings are summarized in Grant v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
97 F. Supp. 2d 986, 989-90 (D. Ariz. 2000) (alteration in original): 
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The results of these two reports were what one would expect.  Plaintiff 
experts were routinely excluded and, as a result, silicone breast implant 
cases dealing with autoimmune and connective tissue diseases—but not 
cases dealing with localized injury—soon became a thing of the past.42 
Clearly there are differences between these two reports and the National 
Research Council’s Forensics Report.  The former two were mostly back-
ward looking, focusing on the science concerning implants and autoim-
mune disease.  The Forensics Report is forward looking, searching for 
ways to improve the quality of forensic evidence.  Nevertheless, the courts 
have responded positively to the increasing research on implants and cor-
responding expert reports.  Why, then, should we anticipate they would not 
act similarly in response to the latter report? 
II.  WHY ARE COURTS SO LENIENT IN ADMITTING EXPERT FORENSIC 
EVIDENCE? 
To answer that question one needs to have some purchase on the ques-
tion of why courts have been so lenient up to this point.  One effort to an-
swer that question comes from Michael Saks. 
A. Saks’ Explanation 
Saks offers several possible explanations.  One explanation is that the 
courts are grandfathering in the traditional forensic sciences.  They would 
never permit a new area of forensic evidence to gain a foothold based on 
such little support.  DNA is, in fact, a case in point.  It took two separate 
 
The executive summary of that Panel reported their conclusion that “[n]o associa-
tion was evident between breast implants and any of the individual connective tis-
sue diseases, all definite connective tissue diseases combined, or the other au-
toimmune/rheumatic conditions”  The Panel also found no association between 
breast implants and atypical connective tissue diseases or any distinctive constel-
lation of symptoms observed in women with breast implants.  Panelists noted that 
their findings and conclusions were unanimous, and that “a large majority of 
scientists in our respective disciplines would find merit on our reviews and analy-
sis.” 
The NAS Committee concluded: 
• There is no increase in primary or recurrent breast cancer in implanted women. 
• [Autoimmune and connective tissue] diseases or conditions are no more common in 
women with breast implants than in women without implants. 
See INST. OF MED., supra note 40 (alteration in original). 
 42.  See Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2005); Allison v. 
McGhan Medical Corp., 184 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 1999); Bristol-Myers Squibb, 97 F. Supp. 
2d at 986.  For discussions of the life cycle of mass tort congregations, see Francis E. 
McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 440, 488 (1986); Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life 
Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1992). 
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National Academy reports on the validity of DNA typing before courts rou-
tinely admitted this evidence.43  Working against this explanation is the fact 
that many courts recognize that Daubert invites re-examination of types of 
testimony that in the past had been routinely admitted.44 
A second explanation is that judges are willing to overlook the short-
comings of forensic evidence “once they are satisfied that they know it is 
being used to bring about the conviction of a person they know to be 
guilty.”45  One way to view this would be through the lens of “harmless er-
ror.”  Other evidence in the case persuades the court that the individual is 
guilty and admitting the forensic evidence therefore will not work an injus-
tice.  But if the forensic evidence is truly superfluous, why not exclude it?  
An even more damning explanation is that judges are prepared to permit 
what they believe to be evidence with no probative value simply because 
they believe most criminal defendants to be guilty. 
Saks rejects all of these arguments in favor of the explanation that judges 
admit the testimony of forensic experts “because they substantially believe 
the claims of these fields.”46  He then offers several explanations for why 
this is the case.  One explanation is that judges use peripheral processing in 
deciding to admit this evidence.  By peripheral processing, social psychol-
ogists mean the decision-maker does not focus on the substance of an ar-
gument—called “central processing”—but rather on other cues to its validi-
ty.  One such cue is the general acceptance of an argument in the society.  
Saks notes that American popular culture generally accepts the forensic 
claims made in the legal context47 and that by calling their fields “scientif-
 
 43. See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 8 (1992); NAT’L 
RES. COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE 88 (1996). 
 44. See, e.g., United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530 (D. Md. 2002). 
 45. Saks, supra note 22, at 334. 
 46. Id. at 335. 
 47. For an illustrative example of this tendency, see the introductory paragraphs in Jen-
nifer L. Mnookin’s article, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of Forensic Science, 75 
BROOK. L. REV. 1209 (2010). 
  On a recent flight, the person next to me on the crowded airplane began to chat 
with me.  When I told her about what I researched and studied, she looked at me 
with a big grin.  “I LOVE forensic science,” she said.  “I watch CSI whenever I 
can.  They can do such amazing things.  It’s all so high tech—and incredibly accu-
rate!  It’s almost like magic, isn’t it?”  She leaned in a bit closer and looked at me 
intently.  “Tell me, is it like that in real life?” 
  I looked at her for a moment before answering.  I felt a bit like the older child 
on the playground about to reveal to her younger friend that Santa Clause doesn’t 
really exist.  I shook my head.  “No, I wouldn’t say that CSI’s depiction is entirely 
realistic.  In the real world, forensic science isn’t nearly so glossy.  It isn’t nearly 
so speedy.  And most important, it isn’t nearly so foolproof, either.” 
SANDERS_CHRISTENSEN 1/31/2011  2:26 PM 
2010] “UTTERLY INEFFECTIVE” 557 
ic,” forensic experts also tap into the general credulity with which we ac-
cept statements made by scientists.  If, in fact, peripheral processing is a 
significant part of the judicial acceptance of forensic experts, then the Fo-
rensics Report should lead to a less lenient approach to admitting forensic 
expert testimony.  The Report is an important voice expressing skepticism 
about many forensic expert assertions and it clearly undermines any effort 
by many forensic experts to wrap themselves in a scientist cloak.  At the 
same time, it undermines the position taken by some judicial opinions 
claiming that forensic expertise has strong scientific underpinnings.  There 
is some hope that this will tip the judicial scales in favor of less lenient ad-
missibility decisions.48 
I, however, remain somewhat skeptical that the Report itself will pro-
duce substantial change.  I take this view in part because I think that in 
another part of its Report, the National Research Council came closer to 
putting its finger on why courts adopt permissive admissibility rules when 
it quoted Joan Griffin and David J. LaMagna for the following proposition: 
“[S]ome courts appear to be loath to insist on [rigorous systematic] re-
search as a condition of admitting forensic science evidence in criminal 
cases, perhaps because to do so would likely ‘demand more by way of va-
lidation than the disciplines can presently offer.’”49 
This quote captures a key insight into all judicial admissibility decisions: 
courts believe admissibility standards should not be set “too high.”  This 
self-imposed judicial constraint is, in my opinion, the product of two other, 
more deeply seated issues: the judiciary’s contextual approach to know-
 
  “Really? That’s too bad,” she told me.  She looked at me directly for a brief 
moment, shook her head, and then looked away.  “Well, to tell you the truth, I 
think I’d rather just keep believing in the television version.”  Figuring that reality 
was not going to be any match for CSI, I shrugged, and went back to the book I 
was reading. 
Id. 
 48. See William C. Thompson, The National Research Council’s Plan to Strengthen Fo-
rensic Science: Does the Path Forward Run Through the Courts?, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 36-
37 (2009). 
  As commentators have noted, there currently are two opposing “literatures” on these 
disciplines.  One literature, consisting of court opinions and the writings of forensic practi-
tioners, holds that these disciplines are valid, well-grounded in science, and easily meet the 
Daubert and Frye standards for admissibility of scientific testimony.  The other literature, 
consisting of commentary by academics (most of whom are not forensic practitioners), 
holds that these disciplines rest on shaky scientific foundations and produce evidence of 
questionable quality.  By adding the considerable weight of the NRC’s authority to the “crit-
ical” literature on forensic identification science, the NRC Report will make it much harder 
for courts to continue siding with forensic practitioners and ignoring the academic critics. 
 49. STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 109 (alteration in original) 
(quoting Joan Griffin & David J. LaMagna, Daubert Challenges to Forensic Evidence: Bal-
listics Next on the Firing Line, 26 CHAMPION 20, 21 (2002)). 
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ledge and the limited ability of science to provide causal information about 
a particular case. 
B. Contextual Approach to Knowledge 
If anything is clear from a comparison between forensic science and tox-
ic tort cases it is that courts do not use a single standard when determining 
whether or not to admit expert testimony.  A brief foray into epistemology 
helps us to understand and, perhaps, to justify this position.50 
The standard approach to the question of when it is proper to say some-
one knows something involves the interplay of three factors: belief, truth 
and justification.51  Belief is a person’s subjective position concerning the 
truth of a proposition.52  Truth is the reality of the proposition independent 
of belief.53  Justification involves the quality of the reasons for a belief.  To 
count as knowledge, something must be believed to be true, it must be true, 
and a person’s belief that it is true must be justified.  In the absence of be-
lief, we have ignorance.54  In the absence of truth, we have error.55  In the 
absence of appropriate justification, we have mere opinion.56  What is most 
noteworthy about this standard approach is that its main concern is not 
knowledge per se but justification.  Even correct beliefs without justifica-
tion are not knowledge. 
For courts, the relevant question is what level of justification should be 
required before experts are permitted to testify.  The legal answer to this 
question has been to adopt a contextual approach to knowledge.57  The cen-
tral idea behind contextualism is that the standards for making knowledge 
 
 50. I have discussed the law’s adoption of a contextual approach at greater length else-
where. See Joseph Sanders, Expert Witness Ethics, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539 (2007); Jo-
seph Sanders, Science, Law, and the Expert Witness, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (2009). 
 51. See D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Rationality, Research and Leviathan: 
Law Enforcement-Sponsored Research and the Criminal Process, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
1023, 1024. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See MICHAEL WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO 
EPISTEMOLOGY 16-19 (2001). 
 57. In fact, there are several variations on the contextual approach. See David Lewis, 
Elusive Knowledge, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY 691 (Ernest Sosa et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2008); see also Stewart Cohen, Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scep-
ticism, Gettier, and the Lottery, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 706; Keith 
DeRose, Solving the Skeptical Problem, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 661; 
Michael Williams, Epistemological Realism, in EPISTEMOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra, at 
51.  Cranor advocates a contextual approach in the area of regulation. See CARL F. CRANOR, 
REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND LAW 152, 152-78 (1993). 
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attributions vary depending on the context within which they are made.  
The rules governing the admissibility of expert testimony are applied in a 
way that is consistent with the contextualist’s fundamental observation that 
the level of justification we require for something to count as knowledge 
varies according to the context within which the belief is held and ex-
pressed.  Within the confines of the present discussion, the most important 
context is the quantity and quality of the available evidence. 
The contextual nature of the legal approach to expertise permits the law 
to sidestep some difficult philosophical questions concerning knowledge 
and get on with the business of deciding cases.58  However, this approach 
does not provide a clear-cut admissibility standard.  One possible standard, 
and indeed the one often espoused by courts, is that an expert should use 
the same level of intellectual rigor that is employed in her field.  The gen-
eral acceptance test articulated in Frye v. United States59 can be understood 
this way.  In Kumho Tire v. Carmichael,60 the United States Supreme Court 
explicitly adopts this test.  The same intellectual rigor test has the virtue 
that it does not set the admissibility threshold too high.  It does not create a 
standard that condemns a whole group of litigants to certain defeat.  It does 
not ask for the impossible.61 
Of course the problem in the forensics area is not that the bar may be set 
too high but that, in some cases, it is set too low.  This leads to the second 
deeply seated issue, the often-limited ability of science to provide causal 
information about a particular case. 
 
 58. One is reminded of Sir Frederick Pollock’s famous aphorism that “[t]he lawyer can-
not afford to adventure himself with philosophers in the logical and metaphysical controver-
sies that beset the idea of cause.” FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 36 (11th ed. 
1920). 
 59. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnoo-
kin, Expert Information and Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 141, 148 (2003). 
 60. 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) (“The objective of [the Daubert] requirement is to ensure 
the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony.  It is to make certain that an expert, wheth-
er basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in the cour-
troom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field.”). 
 61. For example, in the area of toxic torts most agree that the best evidence as to wheth-
er some substance causes human injury is a well-conducted body of epidemiological re-
search.  What should we do, however, when there is no epidemiology with respect to some 
substance?  Following the contextual approach, almost all courts would say that it simply is 
not required. See generally 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 23 (2010-2011). 
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C. Information About the Particular Case 
Science tends to focus on systematic and general knowledge.  As David 
Faigman notes, “[s]cientists typically study variables at the population lev-
el, and most of their methodological and statistical tools are designed for 
this kind of work.”62  The heroes of science are those who are able to put 
forth explanations in terms of general laws that explain a myriad of particu-
lar observations.  The structure of their investigation is to search for the ef-
fects of causes.  The law often is concerned with such general questions, 
e.g. does drug X cause injury Y?  Most trials, however, must deal with spe-
cific events.  They are concerned with what happened to a specific person 
or at a particular crime scene at a specific point in time.  For example, did 
drug X cause the plaintiff’s injury? Were the fingerprints left at the crime 
scene those of the defendant?  That is, the law is searching not for the ef-
fects of cause but instead is searching for the causes of effects.63 
Sometimes experts can provide us with quite precise answers to these 
sorts of questions.  Within the forensic science arena, DNA typing fre-
quently offers substantial exactitude.64  Other forensic areas may offer less 
precise, but still adequate understanding of the cause of some effect.65  Un-
fortunately, in other areas because our understanding of the effects of some 
causes is quite imprecise there is substantial uncertainty surrounding any 
effort to pinpoint the cause of an effect.66 
It is important to note that this problem is not unique to forensic science.  
Consider once again the area of toxic torts.  When substances lead to “sig-
nature diseases,” experts may be substantially certain that the substance 
caused the plaintiff’s injury.  Asbestosis is caused by exposure to asbes-
tos.67  With respect to many other exposures, however, our general under-
standing of the effect of a cause, e.g., that Vioxx causes heart problems, 
does not translate into a clear understanding as to which Vioxx takers with 
heart problems can claim that the drug caused their injury.68  Because 
 
 62. David L. Faigman, Evidentiary Incommensurability: A Preliminary Exploration of 
the Problem of Reasoning From General Scientific Data to Individualized Legal Decision 
Making, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1115, 1115 (2010). 
 63. I borrowed this terminology and several of the points below from A. Philip Dawid, 
The Role of Scientific and Statistical Evidence in Assessing Causality, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
CAUSATION (Richard Goldberg ed., forthcoming 2011). 
 64. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 133. 
 65. Fingerprints are in this category. See generally Mnookin, supra note 24. 
 66. See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 178-79 (discussing 
bloodstain pattern analyses). 
 67. See 3 FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 61, § 26:22. 
 68. See Merck & Co. v. Ernst, 296 S.W.3d 81, 95-101 (Tex. App. 2009). 
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plaintiffs in toxic tort cases must prove specific causation69 they turn to ex-
perts who introduce “differential diagnosis” evidence intended to prove that 
among the many possible causes of the plaintiff’s injury (including un-
known causes) the substance in question is in fact the cause.  The quality of 
this evidence is as mixed as the quality of forensic science evidence.70 
In sum, the combination of a contextual approach to knowledge and the 
limited ability to acquire knowledge about the causes of many effects com-
bine to cause courts to establish low thresholds for the admission of indi-
vidual evidence, be it forensic evidence about the source of a bite mark or 
the specific causation evidence as to whether a drug exposure caused the 
plaintiff’s decedent’s suicide.71  Certainly there is some reliability threshold 
below which even a court with a contextual approach will not go.  But this 
does not influence the many areas where there is some evidence that expert 
opinion, however weak it may be, is superior to lay opinion. 
I do not wish to argue that these two factors, a contextual approach to 
knowledge and expert’s limited ability to pinpoint the causes of effects, are 
the only determinants of admissibility standards.  Other factors surely in-
fluence judges.  However, I do believe that they are elements in the courts’ 
overall approach to expertise.  Moreover, they are both foundational.  They 
are not easily changed.  A contextual approach commits courts to adjust 
admission standards so as to fit within the boundaries of available know-
ledge and the available knowledge on the causes of effects is often quite 
limited.  If I am correct on these points, we should not expect that courts 
would be easily persuaded to exclude whole areas of forensic expertise 
solely because the available evidence is relatively weak.  Undoubtedly, 
Saks is correct to conclude that some judges simply believe that forensic 
expert opinion is well supported by empirical evidence.  Nevertheless, I am 
skeptical that all courts are admitting this evidence because they are fun-
damentally confused about the relevant scientific community whose gener-
al acceptance they should be gauging or because they are simply unable to 
distinguish between weak and strong evidence.  They understand the evi-
dence is weak but admit it anyway. 
If I am correct, the NRC Report will not produce a radical change in 
admissibility standards simply because it will cause the judiciary finally to 
 
 69. That is, it must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the substance in 
question is capable of causing the type of injury suffered (general causation) and that the 
particular injury was caused by the substance (specific causation). See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. C (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 70. See Joseph Sanders, Applying Daubert Inconsistently?  Proof of Individual Causa-
tion in Toxic Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2010). 
 71.  See id. 
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understand the weakness of much forensic data.  To believe this demeans 
both the ability of a cadre of very competent academics to persuade others 
of the merit of their assessment of forensic science and the ability of judges 
to distinguish self-serving reliability assertions by individuals whose live-
lihood turns on the admission of this testimony from the reasoned critiques 
of their arguments. 
III.  WHAT ROLE MIGHT COURTS PLAY? 
This does not mean, however, that courts have no role to play in improv-
ing forensic evidence.  Contextualism and the difficulty of ascertaining the 
causes of effects help to explain why courts are unwilling to exclude whole 
areas of forensic expertise, but they do not explain why courts should be 
unwilling to exclude the worst evidence in a particular field.  For example, 
courts might exclude fingerprint evidence when the trace evidence left at a 
crime scene is of particularly poor quality.  Or they might permit a 
handwriting expert to testify that a signature is a forgery based on many 
exemplars of a known authentic signature while excluding testimony on the 
authorship of an attempted forgery.72 
Why don’t courts more frequently exclude the worst forensic evidence 
and is there anything we can do to encourage them to do so?73  One reason 
courts may be reluctant to take this step is that they cannot easily ascertain 
the relative quality of various proffers.  Of course, much of the blame for 
this state of affairs lies at the feet of the forensic science community, its 
commitment to the ideas of individualization and uniqueness, its unwil-
lingness to recognize in any area other than DNA testing that its conclu-
sions are probabilistic and, therefore, its assertion that any errors that do 
occur are the result of examiner error, i.e., a more proficient examiner 
would not have made this mistake.74  If courts cannot get behind such as-
sertions, they are left with the impossible task of estimating whether a par-
 
 72. See D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or a Fool’s Errand, by One of the 
Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and 
“Forensic Science” in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. 
Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 448-50 (2007). 
 73. Altering the willingness of courts to exclude the worst forensic evidence would 
hopefully encourage forensics experts to improve the overall quality of forensic evidence.  
For several other suggestions for how courts might directly improve the quality of forensic 
evidence, see Michael J. Saks, Protecting Factfinders From Being Overly Mislead, While 
Still Admitting Weakly Supported Forensic Science Into Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 609 
(2007). 
 74. See Simon A. Cole, More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint 
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1042-43 (2005). 
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ticular examiner has reached a particularly suspect conclusion in the case at 
hand. 
The NRC Report will enjoy substantial success if it causes the forensics 
community to abandon this type of argument and do the type of research 
that will permit better calibration of the diagnostic quality of forensic iden-
tifications.  Perhaps it is not possible to produce the type of base rate data 
that makes DNA estimates relatively exact,75 but, as the Report notes, well-
designed research could examine the variables that affect quality.76  Most 
immediately, we could better calibrate reliability through serious proficien-
cy testing.  Such testing would provide estimates of the error rate (the fre-
quency of false positives and false negatives) associated with a reported 
match using data of varying quality using various laboratory procedures.  
This assessment would be independent from the alleged skill of a particular 
examiner. 
Efforts in this direction would benefit from the inclusion of computer al-
gorithms to interpret results.  A movement toward routine, systematic, 
quantified methods of interpretation further reduces the variability in relia-
bility introduced by the use of individual examiners.  More importantly, it 
provides a systematic benchmark against which to judge the reliability of a 
given forensic identification. 
Would any of this actually change current court admissibility practices?  
There is, of course, reason to remain skeptical.  Forensic experts certainly 
have not embraced the NRC Report or its research agenda.77  However, if 
we can begin down this road, there is some evidence that courts may be-
come more aggressive in policing the reliability of forensic expert opinion.  
Consider the case of alcohol testing in drunk driving cases. 
Most comparisons of court admissibility standards pit criminal forensic 
standards against standards in civil cases.78  While these comparisons are 
worthwhile, conclusions must be tempered because of the myriad ways civ-
il and criminal cases differ.  A closer comparison is between alcohol testing 
 
 75. Even if base rate information were available, it might be of little practical value in 
areas such as fingerprint identification.  In most DNA cases, samples contain complete or 
nearly complete information about the sequences of base pairs at multiple loci.  Metaphori-
cally, they are nearly “perfect prints.”  The problem in the real world of fingerprint identifi-
cation is that many latent prints are far from perfect. 
 76.  See STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 11, at 105-06. 
 77. See Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensic Science Reform in the 21st Century: A Major 
Conference, a Blockbuster Report and Reasons to be Pessimistic, 9 LAW, PROBABILITY & 
RISK 1, 3-6 (2010). 
 78. See Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions 
Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1140 (2003); Paul C. Giannelli, 
The Supreme Court’s “Criminal” Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071, 1072-73 
(2003). 
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in drunk driving cases and forensic evidence in other criminal cases.  Both 
pit the state against individuals and both compel the judge to balance the 
welfare and safety of society with the rights of the individual.79  Drunk 
driving admissibility cases indicate that if courts are able to distinguish 
cases based on the quality of the evidence, they will exclude evidence.  
This is not a place for a full discussion of admissibility issues in alcohol 
testing cases.80  I restrict myself to a brief overview and a few examples. 
The need for a method to test whether an individual is intoxicated must 
have arisen shortly after the first automobile departed a tavern.  Statutes 
criminalizing drunk driving were enacted in the first decades of the twen-
tieth century.81  Before the development of objective tests for intoxication, 
courts had to rely exclusively on the testimony of police officers and others 
who in turn relied on behavioral indicia of drunkenness and the presence of 
alcohol on the breath.82  Standards began to change with the development 
of objective chemical tests, e.g., breath and blood tests for the presence of 
alcohol in an individual’s body.83  As the sophistication and accuracy of 
tests improved, admissibility questions changed.  Importantly, courts de-
veloped admissibility standards that exclude the least probative test re-
sults.84 
One should not overstate this tendency.  It is still possible for someone 
to be convicted of driving while impaired based solely on the observations 
of a police officer.  However, these situations most frequently arise when 
the defendant has refused to take a breath test or where for various reasons 
 
 79. One might be concerned that the stakes in drunk driving cases are not as high as they 
are in other criminal cases.  Perhaps on balance this is true, but certainly the stakes in many 
drunk driving cases are far from trivial, especially when someone has been killed and the 
defendant is being prosecuted for manslaughter. See, e.g., State v. Mayl, 833 N.E.2d 1216 
(Ohio 2005).  Cases with potentially more serious consequences for the defendant tend to be 
those in which admissibility issues are raised. 
 80. For a more complete review, see 5 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE § 41 (2008-2009).  Parts of the following discussion rely on this source. 
 81. Pennsylvania passed its first DUI statute in 1909.  It prohibited operation of a motor 
vehicle while intoxicated, without a precise definition of intoxication. See Robert J. Schef-
ter, Under the Influence of Alcohol Three Hours After Driving: The Constitutionality of the 
(A)(5) Amendment to Pennsylvania’s DUI Statute, 100 DICK. L. REV. 441, 444 (1996). 
 82. See H. LAURENCE ROSS, CONFRONTING DRUNK DRIVING: SOCIAL POLICY FOR SAVING 
LIVES 43 (1992). 
 83. See 5 DAVID L.  FAIGMAN, supra note 80, §§ 41:30, 41:55. 
 84. Bransford v. State Taxation & Revenue Dep’t. Motor Vehicle Div., 960 P.2d 827, 
831-32 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Korsakov, 34 S.W.3d 534, 539-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
2000). 
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blood test results have been excluded.85  In most cases, convictions are 
based in part on quantified evidence of intoxication.86  Courts routinely re-
strict the admissibility of expert testimony based on these procedures in a 
number of ways. 
Many courts have established a variety of protocols that must be fol-
lowed if results are to be admitted.  These include: frequently testing 
equipment on a known sample,87 conducting tests within a set period of 
time after the defendant was driving,88 and observing the defendant for a 
period of time (usually fifteen minutes) prior to the administration of the 
test to be certain she did not burp, belch, vomit, smoke, or consume any al-
cohol, thus contaminating the results.89 
Courts are also sensitive to the timing of a test.  What does a test con-
ducted at some later time tell us about the level of intoxication of the de-
fendant while she was driving?90  One way to address this issue is to at-
tempt to extrapolate backward to the time of driving, a procedure often 
called “retrograde extrapolation.”  By statute, some states require an expert 
to extrapolate measured blood alcohol concentration (BAC) back to the 
time the defendant was driving; the absence of expert retrograde extrapola-
tion testimony is fatal to the state’s case.91  However, accurate extrapola-
 
 85. For example, this may occur when blood is tested in a hospital rather than a police 
station, causing chain-of-custody issues to bar admissibility. State v. Busby, 893 So.2d 161, 
164-67 (La. App. 2005); see also State v. Bedell, 556 A.2d 101, 102-03 (Vt. 1989). 
 86. All states have passed “implied consent” statutes, which characterize a driver’s li-
cense as a privilege, rather than a right, which may be suspended if one does not submit to a 
test. See, e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 724.001, 724.031, 724.035 (Vernon 2010). 
 87. Bransford, 960 P.2d at 830; People v. Mickle, 187 Misc. 2d 718, 721-22 (N.Y. J. Ct. 
2001). 
 88. See Allman v. State, 728 N.E.2d 230, 233-34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Pendle-
ton, 849 P.2d 143, 148-49 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that the per se provision re-
quires tests to be performed within two hours of the time the defendant was driving); People 
v. Victory, 166 Misc. 2d 549, 551-53 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1995) (discussing the history of the 
Two Hour Rule in New York). But see People v. Wager, 594 N.W.2d 487, 488-90 (Mich. 
1999) (noting that administering a test within a reasonable time is not a requirement for pur-
poses of the admissibility of the test results). 
 89. Paty v. Dir. of Revenue, 168 S.W.3d 625, 631-32 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005); State v. 
Gregory, No. 96-CO-89, 1999 WL 756440, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1999) (statute 
requires twenty minute observation period); Korsakov, 34 S.W.3d at 539-40; State v. 
Grindstaff, No. 03C01-9704-CR-00139, 1998 WL 126252, at *2-4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 
23, 1998); State v. Guidera, 707 A.2d 704, 704-05 (Vt. 1998). 
 90. In Daubert terms, this may be thought of as a question of “fit.”  Do the results of the 
study support the conclusion the state wishes to draw about a given individual? See Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). 
 91. See Connecticut v. Geisler, 498 U.S. 1019 (1991); State v. Robinett, 106 P.3d 436, 
439-40 (Idaho 2005); Commonwealth v. Colturi, 864 N.E.2d 498, 504-05 (Mass. 2007) (re-
quiring extrapolation evidence if state prosecutes under the “per se” provision in the Massa-
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tions are very difficult absent information about the individual’s consump-
tion behavior during the period immediately preceding the arrest.  When 
the state does attempt to introduce retrograde extrapolation evidence, some 
courts have excluded the testimony as unreliable.92 
In sum, because various tests for blood alcohol concentration are forma-
lized into a set of routine protocols, failure to follow the protocols casts the 
results into question and causes some courts to exclude testimony based on 
the results.  Moreover, in areas such as retrograde extrapolation, because 
we know of the variables that influence the reliability of conclusions, the 
courts are more likely to exclude the evidence when experts cannot control 
for these variables. 
Interestingly, a similar pattern has emerged with respect to field sobriety 
tests.  These tests involve such steps as the “walk and turn” test, the “one-
leg stand” test and a “finger count” test.93  Courts frequently require that 
the officer administering the test receive special training.94  Part of the 
training involves following routine procedures when administering the 
tests.  As the field sobriety tests have become more routine, courts have be-
come more willing to exclude expert testimony when the officer has de-
viated from test protocols.95 
One element of field sobriety tests deserves special mention.  Nystagmus 
is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may be horizontal, 
vertical, or rotary.96  An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as 
they are turned from side to side (in other words, jerking or bouncing) is 
known as horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN).97  Proponents of HGN tests 
believe that alcohol and drug use increases the frequency and amplitude of 
HGN and causes it to occur at a smaller angle of deviation.98  Nystagmus 
 
chusetts statute); State v. Ladwig, 434 N.W.2d 594, 595 (S.D. 1989); State v. Dumont, 499 
A.2d 787, 788-89 (Vt. 1985). 
 92. See Evans v. State, 558 S.E.2d 51, 54-56 (Ga. App. 2001) (excluding defense expert 
testimony); State v. Downey, 195 P.3d 1244, 1251-53 (N.M. 2008); Mata v. State, 46 
S.W.3d 902, 915-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Groggins v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 605, 
607 (Va. 2000). But see State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42 (Haw. 2001); Commonwealth v. Senior, 
744 N.E.2d 614, 619-20 (Mass. 2001) (admitting extrapolation evidence). 
 93. See Volk v. United States, 57 F. Supp. 2d 888, 891 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 94. See United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 (D. Md. 2002); Mullady v. 
State, 606 S.E.2d 645, 646 (Ga. App. 2004). 
 95. State v. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952, 956-57 (Ohio 2000); State v. Hall, No. E-98-088, 
2000 WL 1061875, at *3-4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2000). 
 96. A. Serra & R. Leigh, Diagnostic Value of Nystagmus: Spontaneous and Induced 
Ocular Oscillations, 73 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 615 (2002). 
 97. See John P. Ludington, Annotation, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test: Use in Im-
paired Driving Prosecution, 60 A.L.R.4TH, 1129 (1988). 
 98. See Joseph R. Meaney, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: A Closer Look, 36 JURIMETRICS 
J. 383, 384 (1996). 
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tests have become a routine part of field sobriety tests and are frequently 
introduced as part of the state’s case in drunk driving prosecutions.  Nearly 
from their inception as part of the field sobriety test protocol, most courts 
viewed them as “scientific” and subjected them to an admissibility analy-
sis.99  Courts have excluded HGN results when conducted by an officer not 
trained in the technique100 or when the test was not conducted in accor-
dance with standard procedures.101 
With respect to both chemical tests and field sobriety tests, other courts 
have applied more liberal admissibility standards, often concluding that 
problems with the evidence go to weight, not admissibility.102  My point is 
not that courts routinely bar all questionable chemical or field sobriety 
tests, only that they seem to take a much harder look at this type of expert 
evidence than is ordinary for forensic expert contexts. 
Courts also seem to be sensitive to the error rates associated with various 
methods of detecting impairment.  They distinguish the extraordinarily ac-
curate gas chromatographic tests at one end of the accuracy spectrum to 
preliminary screening tests used in the field at the other end of the spec-
trum.103  That is, courts appreciate the error rates of the various alcohol de-
tection devices.  As a consequence, they have restricted the conclusions 
that may be made based on certain types of evidence.  This is the case with 
respect to preliminary alcohol screening tests.  Courts hold that they may 
 
 99. State v. O’Key, 899 P.2d 663, 674 (Or. 1995); Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 537-39.  An 
appendix to the Horn opinion reviews the field sobriety test case law in all fifty states. 
  HGN tests are far from perfect.  Among other things, the error rates associated with 
field administered HGN tests is not well understood.  Nevertheless, existing evidence sug-
gests that HGN tests are better predictors of impairment than other field sobriety tests. See 
Charles R. Honts & Susan L. Amato-Henderson, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test: The 
State of the Science in 1995, 71 N.D.  L. REV. 671, 688-89 (1995); Steven J. Rubenzer, The 
Standardized Field Sobriety Tests: A Review of Scientific and Legal Issues, 32 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 293 (2008) (questioning the validity of SFSTs as indicators of impaired driving). 
 100. See State v. Crawford, 68 P.3d 848, 853-54 (Mont. 2003); State v. Parker, No. 
51027-4-I, 2003 WL 21738778, at *1-2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 8, 2003). 
 101. See Coone v. Barnes, 266 B.R. 397, 406 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001); Homan, 732 N.E.2d 
at 955-56. 
 102. See Miller v. State, 597 So.2d 767, 769-70 (Fla. 1991); State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42, 
53-54 (Haw. 2001); State v. Tousley, 611 S.E.2d 139, 146-47 (Ga. App. 2005). 
 103. See, e.g., Mogg v. State, 918 N.E.2d 750, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (refusing to rec-
ognize the results of an alcohol monitoring bracelet to indicate anything other than alcohol 
consumption). 
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be used only to show impairment, not a specific BAC level.104  The same is 
true of field sobriety tests, including the HGN test.105 
From one perspective, this brief overview of admissibility issues in 
drunk driving cases is quite discouraging.  One might conclude that courts 
are more solicitous of the rights of drunk drivers than those charged with 
serious felonies.  However, from another perspective I find the courts’ ap-
proach to scientific evidence in alcohol testing cases to be encouraging.  It 
suggests that even if we accept that courts adopt a contextual approach to 
truth, under the right circumstances courts are prepared to exclude less 
probative evidence.  In my estimation, the key difference between many 
areas of forensic evidence and alcohol testing is that in the latter case the 
courts are able to ascertain differences in the quality of evidence.  Thus, 
any steps that assist courts to recognize differences in forensic evidence are 
steps in the right direction.  This means that blind proficiency testing on 
samples of varying quality is an essential first step.  The alcohol-testing 
arena suggests additional ways to achieve this objective. 
The drunk driving example supports the idea that an important first step 
in improving forensic evidence is to routinize procedures and adopt specif-
ic protocols.  This does not mean that courts should automatically exclude 
testimony that does not follow protocols.  They may well conclude, as do 
many drunk-driving cases, that shortcomings go to weight.  But the failure 
to follow protocol does alert courts to the need for special attention to the 
admissibility of expert testimony. 
Similarly, the drunk driving example suggests that it is better to perform 
tests mechanistically.  The advantage of such procedures is that they are 
more likely to make differences in diagnostic quality transparent.  This 
transparency, in turn, allows courts to more easily distinguish between 
more probative and less probative evidence.  This ability is so important 
that it might justify a small diminution in overall quality to create greater 
transparency.  However, it is not clear that individual examiner judgments 
 
 104. See State v. Bartlett, 502 S.E.2d 53, 55 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Verbois v. State, 909 
S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App. 1995).  With continued improvements in the accuracy of alcohol 
screening test equipment, such challenges seem to be less frequent. 
 105. See Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 556; State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 171, 181 (Ariz. 
1986); State v. Garrett, 811 P.2d 488, 491 (Idaho 1991) (“HGN test results may not be used 
at trial to establish the defendant’s blood alcohol level in the absence of the chemical analy-
sis of the defendant’s blood, breath, or urine.”); State v. Bresson, 54 N.E.2d 1330, 1335-36 
(Ohio 1990) (stating that an officer may not give an opinion as to the driver’s actual BAC); 
Burkett v. State, 179 S.W.3d 18, 34 (Tex. App. 2005) (holding that HGN results cannot 
support officer testimony that the defendant is drunk beyond the legal BAC limit). 
  Limitations on the scope of testimony have, in fact, been used in some forensic areas 
such as handwriting and firearm examinations. See Paul C. Giannelli, The NRC Report and 
Its Implications for Criminal Litigation, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 53, 61-62 (2009). 
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are, on average, better than judgments based on a computer algorithm.  
Moreover, when we do rely on mechanistic assessment, the experience in 
alcohol testing and other areas such as DNA testing suggest that these 
techniques are likely to improve over time. 
CONCLUSION 
 In this paper, I have offered an explanation as to why courts have 
been so lenient in admitting forensic evidence in criminal cases.  The com-
bination of a contextual approach to knowledge and the serious deficiency 
of systematic scientific evidence available to answer “the-cause-of-an-
effect” questions push courts toward admissibility.  However, I do not be-
lieve this means we must simply accept the status quo where the courts are 
“utterly ineffective” in policing forensic testimony.  I indicate that this has 
not been the case in another criminal law area, convictions for drunk driv-
ing.  I argue the key reason courts are more restrictive in drunk driving cas-
es is that they have tools that allow them to relatively easily distinguish bet-
ter from worse evidence and I suggest ways the courts might push forensic 
evidence in the same direction. 
These suggestions are aspects of a larger idea.  Whenever possible, we 
should move away from conclusions based on “clinical judgment” and to-
ward conclusions based on more quantified and formal procedures.  Other 
areas have recognized the value of this approach.  Evidence-based medi-
cine is premised on this idea.106 
Some in the forensics community are likely to resist these suggestions 
because they challenge clinical autonomy.  Nevertheless, I believe these 
steps will encourage courts to play a more active role in achieving the twin 
goals of working toward the best possible forensic evidence and at the 
same time excluding the most marginal forensic testimony. 
 
 106. See David M. Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine: A Unified Approach, 24 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 9 (2005). 
